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INTRODUCTION 
A plaintiff’s difficulty in learning before filing suit the identity and role of 
possible defendants is not uncommon these days. Complex relationships in 
governmental, corporate, and societal structures can be hard for a plaintiff to 
unravel without the benefit of discovery, which becomes available only after 
suit is filed. Examples include the inability of plaintiffs to identify or correctly 
name the government officials, police, prison guards, or corporate employees 
whose conduct injured them,1 or to identify the persons or entities that engaged 
in a fraudulent scheme causing financial loss to the plaintiff.2  
Flexibility in pleading is an important feature of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (“Rules”), and Rule 15(a) provides that “[t]he court should freely 
give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”3 However, when an amend-
                                                        
*  David Boies Distinguished Chair & Moise S. Steeg, Jr. Professor of Law, Tulane Univer-
sity School of Law. A.B. 1959, Georgetown University; M.A. 1962, M.A. 1967, University 
of Texas; J.D. 1962, S.J.D. 1981, Harvard Law School. 
1  See, e.g., Roland v. McMonagle, No. 12 Civ. 6331, 2014 WL 2861433, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 24, 2014) (in suit by prisoner claiming he was taken to an unmonitored cell where he 
was beaten and mocked for filing grievances and then transferred to a psychiatric unit to 
cover up the misconduct, amendment after the running of the Statute of Limitations allowed 
to add names of officials whose names were unknown). 
2  See, e.g., In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 468 B.R. 620 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(holding that the bankruptcy trustee in a suit against participants in the fraud was not allowed 
to amend the complaint to add other participants not known after running of the statute of 
limitations). For a detailed background of the mechanics of the Madoff Ponzi scheme and 
events preceding the Trustee’s complaints, see In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 424 
B.R. 122, 125–32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
3  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 1 provides that the rules “should be construed and adminis-
tered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceed-
ing.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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ment is sought after a statute of limitations has run,4 flexibility in pleading must 
be balanced against the objectives of the statute of limitations—that suit be 
filed within a reasonable period of time in order to avoid stale evidence and to 
accord repose to potential defendants so they can get on with their activities 
without the fear of suit hanging over them. 
Thus, Rule 15(c) seeks to reconcile the conflicting goals of providing flex-
ibility in pleading and ensuring adequate notice through filing suit within a set 
period. To achieve the necessary balance, Rule 15(c) provides for “relation 
back” of amendments to the filing date of the original pleading. Thus, an 
amendment to the claim or party set out in a complaint filed within the statute 
of limitations period is said to “relate back” to the filing date of the original 
complaint, and thus is deemed to have been filed within the statute of limita-
tions. The relation back rule contains a number of strict requirements aimed at 
not undermining the concern of the statute of limitations regarding timely no-
tice to parties.  
Lower courts have sometimes taken different approaches to applying those 
requirements. The Supreme Court, in its 2010 decision in Krupski v. Costa 
Crociere S.p.A.,5 waded into the controversy over one of the requirements of 
the relation back principle—that a party brought in by amendment must have 
known or had reason to know that it would have been sued but for a mistake 
concerning the proper party’s identity. Although the Court resolved some is-
sues, a number of questions as to changes in party defendants remain, which 
this article will address. 
I. RULE 15(C) REQUIREMENTS FOR RELATION BACK 
Rule 15(c) requires, first, that the amendment assert “a claim or defense 
that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted 
to be set out—in the original pleading.”6 In addition, if “the amendment chang-
es the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted,”7 the 
party to be brought in must have, within the period provided by Rule 4(m),8 “(i) 
received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on 
the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been 
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”9 
                                                        
4  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 
5  Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010). 
6  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B). 
7  FED R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 
8  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) provides a ninety-day time period in which a defendant must be 
served after a complaint is filed, and this ninety-day period also applies to Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(i) and (ii)’s provisions, in effect extending the statute of limitations period by 
ninety days. 
9  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C). 
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A. Arose out of the Same Conduct, Transaction, or Occurrence Set Out in the 
Original Pleading (Rule 15(c)(1)(B)) 
The same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” test is a workhorse of the 
Federal Rules, resorted to by the drafters in a number of different situations.10 
In Rule 15(c)(1)(B), it serves to ensure that there is a substantial nexus between 
the original and amended pleadings. In the relation back context, the test gener-
ally concerns whether the amended pleading relates to the same general con-
duct or wrong complained of in the original pleading.11 That is satisfied when 
the liability-creating events alleged in the amendment were “but different inva-
sions of [plaintiff’s] primary right and different breaches of the same duty.”12 
Alternative tests applied by some courts include whether the amended pleading 
asserts the “same cause of action” as the original pleading;13 whether there is a 
common core of operative facts uniting the original and newly asserted 
claims;14 whether there has been fair notice of the transaction, occurrence, or 
conduct involved;15 or whether plaintiff will rely on the same kind of evidence 
offered in support of the original claim to prove the new claim, as opposed to 
whether the same legal theory is asserted.16 
A policy-oriented application of the “same conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence” test in Rule 15(c)(1)(B) would center on whether the defendant would 
have been put on notice in the original complaint that the case might ultimately 
encompass the allegations in the amendment. This would be appropriate when 
there is an amendment of claims—in order to ensure that the defendant could 
have anticipated the amended claim, and thus that the objectives of the statute 
of limitations are not undermined by relation back.17 However, when an 
                                                        
10  See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaim); FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (relation back 
of amendments); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties). 
11  Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino, Inc. 91 F.R.D. 543, 545–46 (D. Nev. 1981); De Malherbe v. 
Int’l Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335, 1354–55 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Benco 
Plastics, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 772, 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1974). 
12  Blair v. Durham, 134 F.2d 729, 731 (6th Cir. 1943). 
13  United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 68 (1933) (the “same cause of ac-
tion” test has fixed the limits of amendment with increasing liberality); United Exhibitors, 
Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 18 F.R.D. 469, 472 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Porter v. 
Theo J. Ely Mfg. Co., 5 F.R.D. 317, 321 (W.D. Pa. 1946). 
14  Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 646 (2005); Newell v. Hanks, 283 F.3d 827, 834 (7th Cir. 
2002); FDIC v. Jackson, 133 F.3d 694, 702 (9th Cir. 1998); Lambert v. Babcock & Wilcox, 
Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 877, 888 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (same transaction if arises from the same core 
of facts, even if involving a different substantive legal theory than that advanced in the origi-
nal pleading). 
15  FDIC, 133 F.3d at 702; Morell v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457 (D.P.R. 2000); 
Watkins & Son Pet Supplies v. Iams Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 883, 897 (S.D. Ohio 1999), aff’d, 
254 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2001). 
16  Tran v. Alphonse Hotel Corp., 281 F.3d 23, 36 (2d Cir. 2002). The “same evidence” test 
is particularly applicable to compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a). See Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 600, 602 (D. Mass. 1974). 
17  “Where the requirements of the rule are satisfied, amending the complaint to add a new 
party ‘does not subvert the policies of the statute of limitations.’ ” Perrin v. Stensland, 240 
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amendment pertains to parties, it seems redundant to apply the “same conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence” test to determine whether the defendant was put on 
notice that the case might be expanded; indeed, Rules 15(c)(1)(c)(i) and (ii) ex-
pressly spell out more precise standards regarding notice to parties to be added.  
The issue of notice with respect to the amendment of parties, therefore, has 
been considered by some courts under the more specific conditions for fair no-
tice under Rules 15(c)(1)(C)(i) and (ii). However, (i) and (ii) only set out the 
requirements for notice to the party to be brought in, and not to the original de-
fendant. Thus the “same conduct, transaction, or occurrence” requirement of 
Rule 15(c)(1)(B) can be looked to in order to determine whether the original 
defendant received adequate notice to investigate and prepare for the claim 
against the party to be brought in so as not to be prejudiced. If an amendment 
as to parties only serves to correct a misnomer, for example, there is little 
chance that the original defendant would be prejudiced. However, when an 
amendment adds an entirely new defendant, the standards for notice in (i) and 
(ii) are more precise and should be examined. These standards would govern a 
determination as to whether the original defendant should have appreciated that 
different investigation and preservation of evidence would be necessary if it 
been put on notice, before the statute of limitations ran, that the party to be 
brought in would have been sued but for a mistake.  
B. Party Brought in by Amendment Received Such Notice as It Will Not Be 
Prejudiced—(Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i)) 
Both subsections (i) and (ii) of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) concern adequacy of no-
tice to the party to be brought in, and thus there is potential overlap between 
these two requirements. If the party to be brought in18 knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake, it would have been sued ((ii)), it would neces-
sarily have received “such notice as it will not be prejudiced” ((i)), because it 
would have been aware that it might still be added to the suit by amendment. 
However, some courts have analyzed (i) and (ii) as separate requirements, read-
ing (i) as focusing only on the narrow question of whether the information re-
ceived by the party to be brought in was adequate. 
1. Adequacy of Information (Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i))  
Notice under the Federal Rules need not be formal, and constructive notice 
can be adequate to satisfy the notice requirement of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i). Some 
                                                                                                                                
P.3d 1189, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting North Street Ass’n v. City of Olympia, 635 
P.2d 721 (Wash. 1981)). 
18  The naming of a new defendant in addition to and not in lieu of another defendant mis-
named in the original complaint, constitutes a “change” of the party within the meaning of 
Rule 15(c). Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34, 39 (S.D. Cal. 1966); see also Bayer-
ische Landesbank v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt. LLC, 289 F.R.D. 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(where amendment of investor’s complaint added another company upon discovering that its 
employees were involved, “[t]here is no requirement, however, that an amendment must re-
place a party in order to establish a mistake warranting relation back”). 
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courts have stated that “only service constitutes notice,”19 and others have re-
quired more than mere awareness of the suit.20 However, the better practice 
seems to be otherwise.21 Notice to the party sued may be imputed to the party 
added by amendment if there is an “identity of interests” between them.22 
Constructive notice23 to a party that was not sued originally has been found 
in many common-sense business relationships where one company, not directly 
subject to a lawsuit, is aware of an action against another entity. In Loveall v. 
Employer Health Services, Inc.,24 the corporation named as defendant sent a 
letter to the company that had sold the allegedly defective product, advising 
that, in the view of its attorneys, the latter company would likely be drawn into 
the action. This was found to be sufficient notice.  
The issue often arises when the relationship between actors within a gov-
ernmental, corporate, or institutional structure was not fully understood by the 
plaintiff who, after the statute of limitations had run, desired to change or add a 
party it had discovered to be potentially liable. When one party in such a struc-
ture is sued within the statute of limitations, other officials may also have 
                                                        
19  Williams v. Army & Air Force Exchange Serv., 830 F.2d 27, 30 n.2 (3d Cir. 1987). 
20  See Gardner v. Gartman, 880 F.2d 797, 799 (4th Cir. 1989) (suits against the U.S. and 
certain officials did not constitute notice to the head of the U.S. department where plaintiff 
worked); Bell v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 826 F.2d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1987) (relation back 
not allowed even though administrative hearings put the party to be joined on notice of the 
suit). 
21  See 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1498.1, at 
129–30 (3d ed. 2010). “The conclusion of a growing number of courts and commentators is 
that sufficient notice may be deemed to have occurred where a party who has some reason to 
expect his potential involvement as a defendant hears of the commencement of litigation 
through some informal means.” Kinnally v. Bell of Pa., 748 F. Supp. 1136, 1141 (E.D. Pa. 
1990). 
22  The identity of interests concept, a judicial gloss on Rule 15(c)(1), provides that the institution of 
the action serves as constructive notice of the action to the parties added after the limitations pe-
riod expired, when the original and added parties are so closely related in business or other activ-
ities that it is fair to presume the added parties learned of the institution of the action shortly af-
ter it was commenced. The identity of interest principle is often applied where the original and 
added parties are a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, two related corporations 
whose officers, directors, or shareholders are substantially identical and who have similar names 
or share office space, past and present forms of the same enterprise, or co-executors of an estate. 
Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 102–03 (lst Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). 
But see Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 627 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 
(Ohio App. 1993) (service on parent constituted notice to wholly-owned subsidiary, but the 
third requirement of Rule 15(c)(3)(B) was not met because of lack of showing that the sub-
sidiary knew or should have known that, but for a mistake in identity, the action would have 
been brought against it). 
23  The terms “constructive notice” and “imputed knowledge” are often used interchangea-
bly. The Supreme Court commented in Krupski: 
The Court of Appeals stated that it was “imput[ing]” knowledge to Krupski. Petitioner uses 
the terms “imputed knowledge” and “constructive knowledge” interchangeably in her brief, 
while respondent addresses only actual knowledge. Because we reject the Court of Appeals’ fo-
cus on the plaintiff’s knowledge in the first instance, the distinction among these types of 
knowledge is not relevant to our resolution of this case. 
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 546 n.1 (2010) (alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted). 
24  Loveall v. Emp’r Health Servs., Inc., 196 F.R.D. 399, 403 (D. Kan. 2000). 
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learned of the suit. For example, a plaintiff who sued Gold Dust Casino, Inc., 
was allowed to relate back her amendment to sue Cavanaugh Properties, a part-
nership that owned and operated the casino. The court found that service on the 
president of the casino corporation was adequate to notify the Cavanaugh part-
nership in which the casino president was also a partner. The court noted: “If a 
person who receives notice of the legal action within the limitations period 
should know from the information received that he may be liable to the plaintiff 
by reason of the claim for relief asserted against another, he has received the 
notice required by the Rule.”25 The dual capacities of the person originally 
served “supports the premise that the partnership had such notice of the lawsuit 
within the limitations period as should have induced it to commence investiga-
tions and other preparations to defend itself.”26 
When the same attorney represents both the person or entity served and the 
one proposed to be brought in through amendment, the latter may be consid-
ered to have received notice. For example, in Williams v. Ward,27 the Attorney 
General’s (“AG”) knowledge of a civil rights suit against two prison doctors 
and the superintendent of the prison was imputed to the Commissioner of the 
Department of Corrections.28 In Roland v. McMonagle,29 the plaintiff moved, 
after the statute of limitations had run, to amend the names of the defendant 
correctional officers he had originally sued by name or Doe designation and 
who were represented by the Attorney General’s office. The court held that,  
even if the AG’s office did not know [the names of the officers sought to be 
added], it should have known. Roland’s allegations adequately described the of-
ficers whom he intended to sue, even if he was mistaken as to their names, and 
placed the AG’s office on notice that it needed to investigate the relevant records 
to determine those officers’ identities and prepare a defense. If the AG’s office 
failed to conduct a proper investigation, it must accept the consequences of its 
inaction; it cannot now assert ignorance as a basis for opposing the motion to 
amend.30 
However, the Second Circuit has suggested an additional requirement if an 
attorney’s knowledge is to be imputed to a new defendant. In Gleason v. 
                                                        
25  Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino, Inc. 91 F.R.D. 543, 547 (D. Nev. 1981). 
26  Id. 
27  Williams v. Ward, 553 F. Supp. 1024, 1026 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). 
28  See also Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407–08 (5th Cir. 1980) (knowledge of attorney 
and deputy sheriff imputed to sheriff); Florence v. Krasucki, 533 F. Supp. 1047, 1053–54 
(W.D.N.Y.1982) (defendants listed in the original complaint as “Five Troopers who partici-
pated in the acts which are the subject of this action but whose names are unknown” held to 
have received constructive notice through the Attorney General, the same attorney represent-
ing the named defendant police officer). 
29  Roland v. McMonagle, No. 12 Civ. 6331, 2014 WL 2861433, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 
2014). 
30  Id. at *4; see also Samuels v. Dalsheim, No. 81 Civ. 7050(PKL), 1995 WL 1081308, at 
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1995) (“It is sufficient for the purpose of constructive notice that . . . 
defendants’ counsel knew or should have known that a particular category of defendants 
would be added to the action, without necessarily knowing the actual identity of each de-
fendant to be added.”). 
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McBride,31 the court held that “[i]n order to support an argument that 
knowledge of the pendency of a lawsuit may be imputed to a defendant or set 
of defendants because they have the same attorney(s), there must be some 
showing that the attorney(s) knew that the additional defendants would be add-
ed to the existing suit.”32 The assistant corporation counsel assigned to the case 
submitted an affidavit stating that prior to the amendment, he had no 
knowledge that any additional defendants would be added to the suit, but the 
court determined that the corporation counsel should have known that the addi-
tional defendants would be added. The plaintiff named the city as a defendant 
in addition to naming the officers who allegedly beat him, and given these fac-
tors, the court found that the corporation counsel should have known that mu-
nicipal supervisory employees would also be added as defendants. 
Constructive notice can be provided through such means as publicity in the 
press if sufficiently detailed. However, mere publicity concerning general 
wrongful activities of an organization may not be sufficient to provide notice to 
an officer not named in the original complaint. In re IndyMac Mortgage-
Backed Sec. Litigation33 was a suit against banks that were major participants 
in the mortgage-backed security markets that crashed in the late 2000s. Plain-
tiffs sought to relate back an amendment to add a major bank officer based on 
his being “the subject of multiple lawsuits and news articles questioning his 
leadership and responsibility for the IndyMac business practices.”34 These alle-
gations were found to be insufficient to show that he knew or should have 
known that he would have been sued but for a mistake.  
The question of adequate notice has arisen in auto accident cases where a 
driver is sued without the plaintiff being aware that he has died, and an 
amendment is sought to substitute the driver’s estate after the statute of limita-
tions has run. Relation back has been allowed due to the “community of inter-
est” between the named and the sought-to-be joined defendants, and insurance 
carriers are commonly found to fall within the same community.35  
Viewing Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i) solely as focusing on the adequacy of infor-
mation received by the party to be brought in so that it is deemed to have re-
ceived constructive notice neglects the fact that subsections (i) and (ii) are 
closely intertwined. Courts often combine the discussion of notice under the 
two subsections, thus bringing into play the requirement that the notice re-
ceived must be such that the party will not be prejudiced.  
                                                        
31  Gleason v. McBride, 869 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989). 
32  Id. at 693. 
33  In re IndyMac Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
34  Id. at 507. 
35  LaRue v. Harris, 115 P.3d 1077, 1079 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (insurer had knowledge of 
the accident, and because it shared a community of interest with the estate, its knowledge 
was imputable to the estate, and the estate was not prejudiced in maintaining a defense be-
cause, except for substituting the estate in place of the deceased, the amended claim was the 
same as the original one). 
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2. Such That the Party to Be Brought in Will Not Be Prejudiced 
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i) requires additionally that the party to be brought in 
“received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on 
the merits.” Lack of prejudice can result from having received the notice, and 
therefore the adequacy of the notice is also relevant. An obvious kind of preju-
dice that could arise from amending a complaint is delay, if discovery and trial 
preparation have to be extended because of changing or adding a party. Under 
Rule 15(a), delay is a proper subject of consideration as to whether an amend-
ment should be allowed in the first place “when justice so requires.”36 Thus, the 
Supreme Court has ruled, in the context of changing a claim by amendment, 
that leave to amend should be granted under Rule 15(a) “[i]n the absence of any 
apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive 
on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allow-
ance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.”37 
“Prejudice arises when the amendment would ‘(i) require the opponent to 
expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for 
trial; (ii) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute; or (iii) prevent the 
plaintiff from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction.’ ”38 
When there is a change of a party, the lack of prejudice required by Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(i) is even more specific than that required by the Rule 15(a) right to 
amend. There is a possible overlap between the prejudice that would prevent a 
court from granting a right to amend at all under Rule 15(a), and the specific 
prejudice required in subpart (i). However, they do not seem markedly different 
in most respects, and in fact, courts have not usually attempted to distinguish 
between them. 
Relevant to whether the party to be brought in will be prejudiced is wheth-
er the issues raised by bringing in a new party will be similar and will require 
much the same investigation and evidence as the claim against the original de-
fendant. Where the same defenses will be made by the new defendant as would 
be made by the original defendant, prejudice will not be found.39 In Roland v. 
McMonagle,40 the defendant objected that the two officers to be added would 
be prejudiced because their defenses differed from those of the original defend-
ants. The court observed that all five officers now sued were alleged to have 
“acted in concert to deprive [the plaintiff] of his rights in essentially the same 
                                                        
36  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). 
37  Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “Mere delay, however, absent a showing of 
bad faith or undue prejudice, does not provide a basis for a district court to deny the right to 
amend.” State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981). 
38  Soroof Trading Dev. Co. v. GE Microgen, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 142, 147 (S.D.N.Y 2012) 
(quoting Block v. First Blood Associates, 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d. Cir. 1993)). 
39  See, e.g., Estate of Ratcliffe v. Pradera Realty Co., No. 05 Civ. 10272(JFK), 2007 WL 
3084977, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2007). 
40  Roland v. McMonagle, No. 12 Civ. 6331, 2014 WL 2861433 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2014). 
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manner,” and the AG’s office could present “largely the same defenses.”41 Fi-
nally, the court found that the procedural posture of the case—with no motion 
for summary judgment pending and discovery still ongoing—mitigated con-
cerns over prejudice.42  
3. Added Party’s Knowledge That, but for a Mistake, It Would Have Been 
Sued (Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)) 
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) focuses on the knowledge of the party to be brought in 
that it would have been sued “but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s 
identity.”  
[C]ourts . . . apply something akin to a reasonableness test to determine whether 
the party “should have known” it was the one intended to be sued. Relation back 
will be refused only if the court finds that there is no reason why the party to be 
added should have understood that it was not named due to a mistake.43 
“Because the inquiry is an objective one, the court should consider the totality 
of the circumstances and the relevant facts at issue.”44  
Defining what is a mistake has been a major cause of disagreement among 
lower courts. A number of circuit courts held that if a plaintiff did not know the 
names of certain defendants and only learned those names after the statute of 
limitations had run, the amendment would not relate back because it was not a 
mistake. In Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Department,45 plaintiff sought to add 
six named police officers to his suit originally filed against the police depart-
ment and “John Doe” officers. The failure to have sued the officers originally 
was found to be due to lack of knowledge as to their identities and not a mis-
take in their names. The Second Circuit noted that the Advisory Committee 
Notes state that Rule 15(c) deals with the problem of a misnamed defendant.46 
“This commentary,” it stated, “implies that the rule is meant to allow an 
amendment changing the name of a party to relate back to the original com-
plaint only if the change is the result of an error, such as a misnomer or misi-
dentification.”47 It went on to cite other circuit courts that had held similarly. 
                                                        
41  Id. at *5. 
42  See also Soroof Trading, 283 F.R.D. at 153 (“[A]ny new discovery is not likely to be bur-
densome, as no new theory of recovery is added—instead, the operative facts at the founda-
tion of the case remain the same.”). 
43  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 1498.3 at 169–72; see also Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 
F.3d 315, 319–20 (5th Cir. 1998); Ratcliffe v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 482 F. Supp. 759, 763 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). 
44  Bowden ex rel. Bowden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1242 (M.D. Ala. 
2000); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 1498.3 at 172 n.4. 
45  Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 1995). 
46  Id. 
47  Id. The court cited Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1993) (Rule 
15(c)(1)(C) “permits an amendment to relate back only where there has been an error made 
concerning the identity of the proper party and where that party is chargeable with 
knowledge of the mistake, but it does not permit relation back where . . . there is a lack of 
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We are compelled to agree with our sister circuits that Rule 15(c) does not 
allow an amended complaint adding new defendants to relate back if the newly-
added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know 
their identities. Rule 15(c) explicitly allows the relation back of an amendment 
due to a “mistake” concerning the identity of the parties (under certain circum-
stances), but the lack of knowledge of a party’s identity cannot be characterized 
as a mistake. 
. . . Since the new names were added not to correct a mistake but to correct 
a lack of knowledge, the requirements of Rule 15(c) for relation back are not 
met.48 
The paradigm for a mistake under these decisions that would justify rela-
tion back would be a complaint against the government which stated the wrong 
name of the agency or named the wrong officer or one who was no longer in 
that position.49 A number of other circuits adopted a similar interpretation of 
“mistake” as the Second Circuit’s Barrow decision,50 but other circuits, took a 
different approach.51 That approach was essentially that a plaintiff could still 
make a “mistake” as to the names or responsibilities of parties it did not sue, 
even if it was aware of those parties’ existence. This circuit split led the Su-
preme Court to grant certiorari in Krupski. 
                                                                                                                                
knowledge of the proper party.”); Wilson v. United States, 23 F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1994); 
W. Contracting Corp. v. Bechtel Corp., 885 F.2d 1196, 1201 (4th Cir. 1989). 
48  Barrow, 66 F.3d at 470. 
49  See Donald v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 560 (7th Cir. 1996). 
50  Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (denying relation back 
where an employee sued her supervisor for assault and later sought to add the employer, 
claiming that she was not fully aware of the employer’s responsibility for the supervisor’s 
actions until it filed an amicus brief stating that the supervisor’s actions were in the course of 
his employment); La.-Pac. Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 5 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1993) (mistake 
as to which of two known parties was the proper successor-in-interest of a company liable to 
plaintiff does not justify relation back). 
51  Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that 
plaintiff’s knowledge of proper corporate defendant’s existence and name meant that no mis-
take had been made); Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 208 (3d Cir. 2006) (“A ‘mistake’ 
is no less a ‘mistake’ when it flows from lack of knowledge as opposed to inaccurate de-
scription.”); Leonard v. Parry, 219 F.3d 25, 28–29 (lst Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s knowledge of 
proper defendant’s identity was not relevant to whether she made a mistake concerning the 
identity of the proper party). The First Circuit stated that “[v]irtually by definition, every 
mistake involves an element of negligence, carelessness, or fault—and the language of Rule 
15(c)(3) does not distinguish among types of mistakes concerning identity. Properly con-
strued, the rule encompasses both mistakes that were easily avoidable and those that were 
serendipitous.” Id. at 29. The court also refused to find that the fact that the defense attorney 
had notified plaintiff’s lawyer of the mistake before the statute ran would prevent relation 
back. Id. at 30. It found that “what the plaintiff knew (or thought he knew) at the time of the 
original pleading generally is the relevant datum in respect to the question of whether a mis-
take concerning identity actually took place,” and that what plaintiff learned later is not rele-
vant. Id. at 29. 
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a. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A. 
Mrs. Krupski “tripped over a cable and fractured her femur while she was 
on board the cruise ship Costa Magica.”52 Upon her return home, she acquired 
counsel and began the process of seeking compensation. She sued an entity 
named Costa Cruise Lines, based in part on confusing representations on the 
website and the front of the ticket indicating that Costa Cruise was the carrier. 
Costa Cruise was in fact only the sales and marketing agent of the carrier Costa 
Cruciere S.p.A. Shortly after the limitations period expired, Costa Cruise in-
formed the plaintiff of the existence of Costa Crociere. Krupski waited 133 
days to seek leave to amend and then waited another month to file an amended 
complaint naming Costa Crociere as a defendant. The district court denied rela-
tion back, and Costa Crociere successfully moved for dismissal. The Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.53 It first decided that Krupski either knew or 
should have known of the proper party’s identity and that she had made a de-
liberate choice instead of a mistake in not naming Costa Crociere as a party in 
her original pleading.  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that relation back under Rule 
15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party to be brought in knew or should have 
known, not on the amending party’s knowledge or timeliness in seeking to 
amend the pleading. With Justice Sonia Sotomayor writing for the majority, the 
Court reasoned that the text of Rule 15 asks what the prospective defendant 
knew or should have known, not what the plaintiff knew or should have known 
(the test as determined by the Eleventh Circuit). The opinion further reasoned 
that Costa Crociere should have known that Krupski’s failure to name it as a 
defendant was due to a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity. Thus, 
Krupski should be allowed to add Costa Crociere in her complaint.54 
The opinion specifically rejected the idea that a plaintiff’s “knowledge of a 
party’s existence” constitutes an “absence of mistake.” A mistake, it said, is 
“[a]n error, misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.”55 Thus, 
merely because a plaintiff knows of a party’s existence does not preclude find-
ing that she made a mistake with respect to that party’s identity:  
A plaintiff may know that a prospective defendant—call him party A—exists, 
while erroneously believing him to have the status of party B. Similarly, a plain-
                                                        
52  Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010). 
53  Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., LLC, 330 F. App’x 892, 895–96 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(per curiam). 
54  Justice Antonin Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment. He noted that he did not support the majority’s use of the Notes of the Advisory 
Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in reaching its decision. Krupski v. Costa 
Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 557 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
55  Id. at 548–49 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 
1092 (9th ed. 2009)) (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1446 (2002) 
(“defining ‘mistake’ as ‘a misunderstanding of the meaning or implication of something’; ‘a 
wrong action or statement proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate knowledge, or inat-
tention’; ‘an erroneous belief’; or ‘a state of mind not in accordance with the facts’ ”)). 
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tiff may know generally what party A does while misunderstanding the roles 
that party A and party B played in the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” giv-
ing rise to her claim. If the plaintiff sues party B instead of party A under these 
circumstances, she has made a “mistake concerning the proper party’s identity” 
notwithstanding her knowledge of the existence of both parties. The only ques-
tion under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), then, is whether party A knew or should have 
known that, absent some mistake, the action would have been brought against 
him.56 
The Court also noted that:  
[A] plaintiff might know that the prospective defendant exists but nonetheless 
harbor a misunderstanding about his status or role in the events giving rise to the 
claim at issue, and she may mistakenly choose to sue a different defendant based 
on that misimpression. That kind of deliberate but mistaken choice does not 
foreclose a finding that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) has been satisfied.57 
The opinion found this reading to be consistent with the purpose of relation 
back:  
Our reading is also consistent with the history of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). That provi-
sion was added in 1966 to respond to a recurring problem in suits against the 
Federal Government, particularly in the Social Security context. Individuals who 
had filed timely lawsuits challenging the administrative denial of benefits often 
failed to name the party identified in the statute as the proper defendant—the 
current Secretary of what was then the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare—and named instead the United States; the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare itself; the nonexistent “Federal Security Administration”; or 
a Secretary who had recently retired from office. By the time the plaintiffs dis-
covered their mistakes, the statute of limitations in many cases had expired, and 
the district courts denied the plaintiffs leave to amend on the ground that the 
amended complaints would not relate back. Rule 15(c) was therefore “amplified 
to provide a general solution” to this problem. It is conceivable that the Social 
Security litigants knew or reasonably should have known the identity of the 
proper defendant either because of documents in their administrative cases or by 
dint of the statute setting forth the filing requirements.58 
The purpose of relation back in Rule 15(c), the Krupski opinion said, is “to 
balance the interests of the defendant protected by the statute of limitations 
with the preference expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in gen-
eral, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes on their merits.”59 Repose 
is a principal objective sought by the statute of limitations. Thus,“[a] prospec-
tive defendant who legitimately believed that the limitations period had passed 
without any attempt to sue him has a strong interest in repose.”60 However, 
“repose would be a windfall for a prospective defendant who understood, or 
                                                        
56  Id. at 549. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. at 550–51 (citations omitted). 
59  Id. at 550 (citing Advisory Committee’s 1966 Notes 122; 3 Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 
15.02[1], 15.19[3][a] (3d ed. 2009)). 
60  Id. 
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who should have understood, that he escaped suit during the limitations period 
only because the plaintiff misunderstood a crucial fact about his identity.”61 
The Eleventh Circuit opinion, and other opinions giving a restrictive read-
ing of “mistake,” reflected concern over a plaintiff’s failure properly to investi-
gate the facts (essentially a failure to perform “due diligence”) as to who was 
the correct defendant. The Krupski opinion viewed information in the plain-
tiff’s possession as relevant only “if it bears on the defendant’s understanding 
of whether the plaintiff made a mistake regarding the proper party’s identity.”62 
Responding to the defendant’s argument that the key issue under Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is whether the plaintiff made a “deliberate choice” to sue one 
party over another, the Court agreed that “making a deliberate choice to sue one 
party instead of another while fully understanding the factual and legal differ-
ences between the two parties is the antithesis of making a mistake concerning 
the proper party’s identity.”63 It disagreed, however, with the position that if a 
plaintiff is aware of the existence of two parties and chooses to sue the wrong 
one, the proper defendant could reasonably believe that the plaintiff did not 
make a mistake.  
Thus, the Court determined that close scrutiny of the plaintiff’s conduct 
was not required by the relation back rule.  
[Although] a court may consider a movant’s “undue delay” or “dilatory motive” 
in deciding whether to grant leave to amend under Rule 15(a) . . . the contrast 
between Rule 15(a) and Rule 15(c) makes clear [that] the speed with which a 
plaintiff moves to amend her complaint or file[] an amended complaint after ob-
taining leave to do so has no bearing on whether the amended complaint relates 
back.64  
However, the fact remains that “[t]o the extent the plaintiff’s postfiling conduct 
informs the prospective defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff ini-
tially made a ‘mistake concerning the proper party’s identity,’ a court may con-
sider the conduct.”65 But “[t]he plaintiff’s postfiling conduct is otherwise im-
material to the question whether an amended complaint relates back.”66 
                                                        
61  Id. 
62  Id. at 548. 
63  Id. at 549. 
64  Id. at 553 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962);  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
21, § 1498, at 142–43 & nn. 49–50 (2d ed. 1990 & supp. 2010)). The Krupski opinion em-
phasized another difference between Rules 15(a) and 15(c), that while Rule 15(a) leaves dis-
cretion to the court as to whether to allow an amendment, Rule 15(c) mandates relation back 
if the requirements are satisfied. The Court viewed consideration of the plaintiff’s conduct as 
an additional requirement not provided for in the rule. Id. 
65  Id. at 554 (citing Leonard v. Parry, 219 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[P]ost-filing events 
occasionally can shed light on the plaintiff’s state of mind at an earlier time” and “can in-
form a defendant’s reasonable beliefs concerning whether her omission from the original 
complaint represented a mistake (as opposed to a conscious choice)”)). 
66  Id. 
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II. POST-KRUPSKI DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Deliberate Choice Not to Sue 
The Krupski opinion said that “a deliberate choice to sue one party instead 
of another while fully understanding the factual and legal differences between 
the two parties is the antithesis of making a mistake concerning the proper par-
ty’s identity.”67 It is not clear exactly what situations would permit a court to 
find that a deliberate choice had been made not to sue a party whom a plaintiff 
later seeks to bring in by amendment. It is also unclear what degree of certainty 
would be required to conclude that a plaintiff fully understands the factual and 
legal differences between the parties. One clear example would be when the 
plaintiff eschews suing someone for strategic reasons, such as to lull that per-
son or the named defendant into not properly investigating the case while the 
evidence is still fresh, or for other tactical advantages. That situation, however, 
would already be ineligible for relation back under the requirement in Rule 
15(c) that the notice be “such that party to be brought in would not be preju-
diced.”68  
Even before Krupski, courts recognized that there is a difference between 
correcting a legitimate misunderstanding of the law or facts and strategic mo-
tives in making an amendment. In a suit to enjoin a state regulatory board’s or-
der, a court allowed plaintiff cable operators to amend to add individual mem-
bers of the board where direct suits against the state are barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. The court stated that:  
While the amendment [sought] here is arguably more substantive than an 
amendment to correct a simple misnomer or misidentification of a party, it has 
considerably less in common with the kinds of strategic amendments at issue in 
the cases cited by Defendants. . . . Failing to anticipate the technical Eleventh 
Amendment defense raised by the Board and the possible Ex parte Young excep-
tion to that defense, is, on the facts of this case, the kind of mistake referred to 
Rule 15(c).69  
Despite Krupski’s admonition that the plaintiff’s lack of due diligence is 
not the issue, there are situations where relation back is denied for failure 
properly to investigate. In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Securities Litigation70 
provides an example of a post-Krupski case that found that there had been a 
“deliberate choice” not to sue a party who was later sought to be brought in. In 
a massive consolidated case involving the collapse of the mortgage-backed se-
curities market, claims had been made against major financial institutions by 
states, cities, and pension funds. Wyoming sued Bank of America (“BoA”), but 
later sought to bring in Merrill Lynch. Citing Krupski, the court found that al-
though Wyoming was “quite aware” of Merrill Lynch’s role as an underwriter 
                                                        
67  Id. at 549. 
68  See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text. 
69  Mountain Cable Co. v. Pub. Serv. Bd., 242 F. Supp. 2d 400, 408–09 (D. Vt. 2003). 
70  In re IndyMac Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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and in drafting and disseminating offering documents, it chose not to name 
Merrill Lynch as a defendant but to sue BoA in its capacity as successor-in-
interest to Merrill Lynch.71 Not only was this a deliberate choice, the court said, 
but Wyoming had failed to plead any facts that would support holding BoA lia-
ble for Merrill Lynch’s acts. Merrill Lynch was therefore “entitled to . . . as-
sume that Wyoming, despite having a detailed awareness of Merrill Lynch’s 
role and conduct in the events at issue, chose instead to sue BoA.”72 Thus there 
is still room after Krupski to focus on the plaintiff’s knowledge and to find a 
deliberate choice not to sue that prevents relation back. 
B. Inexcusable Neglect 
The requirement of “inexcusable neglect” does not appear in the text of any 
federal or state rule pertaining to relation back. Nevertheless, it has become 
firmly embedded in the case law of some states as grounds for denying relation 
back. In this respect, the state law diverges from the federal rule, as articulated 
in Krupski, that Rule 15(c) has only three prerequisites for relation back.73  
Washington state law imposes a fourth and independent prerequisite for re-
lation back—that the failure to sue originally did not result from inexcusable 
neglect.74 In North Street Association v. City of Olympia, the Supreme Court of 
Washington found that plaintiffs were “at all times aware of the necessary par-
ties and yet still failed originally to name them.”75 No reason for the omission 
appeared in the record, and the court concluded that “[t]he omission therefore 
must be characterized as inexcusable neglect and, consequently, [the state 
counterpart to Rule 15(c)] was inapplicable to these cases.”76  
Under Krupski, plaintiff’s due diligence in not investigating the law and 
facts adequately is not a basis for denying the relation back of an amendment. 
However, at some point the plaintiff’s extreme lack of due diligence might be-
                                                        
71  Id. at 650. 
72  Id. 
73  Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 552–53 (2010). (“The Rule plainly sets 
forth an exclusive list of requirements for relation back, and the amending party’s diligence 
is not among them. Moreover, the Rule mandates relation back once the Rule’s requirements 
are satisfied; it does not leave the decision whether to grant relation back to the district 
court’s equitable discretion. . . . The mandatory nature of the inquiry for relation back under 
Rule 15(c) is particularly striking in contrast to the inquiry under Rule 15(a), which sets forth 
the circumstances in which a party may amend its pleading before trial.” (citation omitted)). 
74  See, e.g., South Hollywood Hills Citizens Ass’n v. King Co., 677 P.2d 114, 118 (Wash. 
1984). “Thus, a court must determine whether the requirements of CR 15(c) are met and the 
court must determine whether failure to join the plaintiffs earlier was the result of inexcusa-
ble neglect.” Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash. 2d 107, 173 (1987); 
see also Coastal Bldg. Corp. v. City of Seattle, 828 P.2d 7, 10 n.6 (referring to “CR 15(c), 
with its judicially super-imposed inexcusable neglect exception to ‘relation back’ ”). 
75  North Street Ass’n v. City of Olympia, 635 P.2d 721, 726 (Wash. 1981). 
76  Id. 
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come a “deliberate choice” that justifies refusal to relate back under Rule 
15(c).77  
In Perrin v. Stensland,78 the plaintiff was injured in an auto accident and 
sued the defendant, not knowing that he had died since the accident. He sought 
to add the defendant’s estate after the statute of limitations had run. The estate 
argued that the plaintiff was guilty of inexcusable neglect for failing to notice 
the process server’s designation of defendant’s wife as “Spouse/Widow” on the 
return of service, and failing to notice her interrogatory response as “widow,” 
before the statute of limitations expired. The trial court found the delay in suing 
the estate after learning of the defendant’s death (from March to February) in-
excusable.79 The Court of Appeals, citing Krupski but recognizing that it was 
bound by the Washington “inexcusable neglect” requirement, took a more leni-
ent approach: 
In the present case, however, there was no reason to believe [plaintiff] made 
a strategic choice to avoid naming the estate; no concern about adequate notice 
to the estate; and no identified prejudice to the estate. The trial court erroneously 
interpreted the case law as calling for an exercise of equitable discretion to eval-
uate whether [plaintiff] moved quickly enough to correct his mistake about the 
identity of the proper defendant. This view is inconsistent with liberal construc-
tion of the rule. . . . [H]ere the record provides a satisfactory reason why [plain-
tiff] initially failed to name the estate as a party: he did not know [the defendant] 
was dead.80 
C. John Doe Designations 
There was no attempt to sue John Doe defendants in Krupski; the amend-
ment simply sought to replace the company originally sued with the company 
that was the responsible carrier. Thus, many courts that had followed the stand-
ard reflected in the Second Circuit’s Barrow decision81 and the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Krupski82—that the plaintiff’s knowledge is relevant, and 
failure to identify individual defendants when the plaintiff knows of their exist-
ence cannot be a mistake—have continued to adhere to that rule regarding John 
Doe defendants.83 “In essence, these circuit courts have determined that section 
                                                        
77  See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text. 
78  Perrin v. Stensland, 240 P.3d 1189, 1190 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
79  “I think they would have been in good faith then. It would have been excusable neglect 
. . . but they waited until February.” Id. at 1195. 
80  Id. at 1197. 
81  See supra text accompanying notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
82  See supra notes 54–63. 
83  Decisions indicating that circuit courts will continue to follow the rule that lack of 
knowledge is not a mistake regarding John Doe designations include Hogan v. Fischer, 738 
F.3d 509, 517–18 (2d Cir. 2013) (Barrow rule remains valid law); Smith v. City of Akron, 
476 F. App’x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012) (Rule 15(c) only “allows relation back for the mistaken 
identification of defendants, not for defendants to be named later through ‘John Doe,’ ‘Un-
known Defendants,’ or other missing appellations.”); Flournoy v. Schomig, 418 F. App’x 
528, 532 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[t]he untimely amendment would not ‘relate back’ to the date of 
his original complaint because [plaintiff] made no mistake; he simply lacked knowledge of 
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[15](c)(1)(C) simply does not cover the John Doe situation.”84 Nevertheless, 
there is disagreement between courts as to whether that position is consistent 
with Krupski. 
There is no provision in the federal statutes or Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure either authorizing or prohibiting the use of fictitious names like John 
Doe when a party does not know the actual names or identities.85 However, 
many federal courts have held that use of John Doe designations is not permis-
sible.86 In some circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, these designations are not 
favored, but are permissible where the identity of the alleged defendant is not 
known at the time of the filing of the complaint. In such circumstances, the 
plaintiffs should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the un-
known defendant.87 Some state court rules expressly provide for Doe designa-
tions.88 
Prior to Krupski, a number of courts refused to allow John Doe or other 
general descriptions of defendants to be amended later when the identities are 
discovered. One might think that inability to identify certain defendants prior to 
discovery would be a paradigm for relation back under Rule 15(c), especially 
since it also must be shown that the party to be brought in had such notice that 
it would not be prejudiced and should have known it would have been sued but 
for a mistake. The continuation of a strict interpretation of the relation back rule 
as not allowing substitution for fictitious names seems particularly to reflect the 
concern of some federal courts over spurious civil rights suits against govern-
ments that join individual officials without naming them. Another concern is 
that Doe designations will be used to serve as “placeholders” for individuals for 
whom there is no present reason to suspect liability. 
Excluding fictitious names from Rule 15(c) relation back has been based 
on a variety of rationales. The “lack of knowledge is not a mistake” rationale 
was often invoked before Krupski, and seems to have survived Krupski in some 
courts. 
By naming John Doe as the second defendant, plaintiffs did not make a mistake 
in identification. They accurately identified the second defendant as unknown. 
Because plaintiffs’ failure to name John Doe stemmed from lack of knowledge 
                                                                                                                                
the proper defendants”); Everett v. Prison Health Servs., 412 F. App’x 604 (4th Cir. 2011) (a 
party cannot add Doe defendants later because the relation back rule only allows substitution 
of mistakenly identified defendants). But see Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Techs. Racing 
Corp., 638 F.3d 555, 559–60 (7th Cir. 2011) (a different panel restating the Krupski re-
quirements as the test). 
84  Palacio v. City of Springfield, 25 F. Supp. 3d 163, 166 (D. Mass 2014). 
85  Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1969). 
86  See Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: Is It Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize 
John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883 (1996). 
87  Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Johnson v. Udall, 292 F. 
Supp. 738, 751 (C.D. Cal. 1968). 
88  See infra text accompanying note 100. 
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rather than a mistake in identification, the plain language of Rule 15(c)(3) [now 
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)] does not permit relation back.89 
It has been suggested that the “lack of knowledge” argument is only rele-
vant after Krupski as to whether an amendment should be permitted at all under 
Rule 15(a), rather than whether there was a mistake under Rule 15(c).90 In any 
event, after Krupski the “no mistake” rationale is hard to justify. Some pre-
Krupski cases have also found the use of fictitious names to be a “deliberate 
choice” not to sue named defendants.91 Exclusion of substitution for fictitious 
names has also been said to prevent their use “to circumvent statutes of limita-
tions because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a 
change in the party sued.”92  
Since Krupski, a number of courts have continued to view substitutions for 
Doe designations as not qualifying for relation back. Some circuit courts have 
simply ignored Krupski as not applying to Doe designations, while others have 
reiterated their previous “no mistake” precedents. An interesting development 
is how the Second Circuit has dealt with its pre-Krupski approach in Barrow.93 
In Hogan v. Fischer,94 a prisoner, acting pro se, brought a § 1983 civil rights 
action against various correction officers, including some designated as John 
Doe, alleging that masked officers sprayed him with an unknown substance 
while he was in his cell, apparently a mixture of fecal matter, vinegar, and ma-
chine oil. The Second Circuit ruled that plaintiff could not substitute names ob-
tained through discovery for the Doe defendants after the statute of limitations 
had run. Without mentioning Krupski, it held the plaintiff was not entitled to 
relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) because “[t]his Court’s interpretation of 
                                                        
89  Henry v. FDIC, 168 F.R.D. 55, 59 (D. Kan. 1996); accord Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 
315, 320–21 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Butler v. Robar Enters., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 621, 623–24 
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (amendment to substitute employer’s CEO for a “John Doe” defendant in 
employment discrimination suit did not relate back because the employee made no mistake 
in identifying the correct defendant in the original complaint; “the courts of appeal that have 
confronted the issue are in near-unanimity that lack of knowledge is not a ‘mistake.’ ”); Bass 
v. World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 491, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (when 
plaintiff knew of employee’s involvement when she filed her complaint, but did not attempt 
to excuse her failure to name him as a defendant, not a case of mistaken identity). 
90  See Leonard v. Parry, 219 F.3d 25, 30 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (“A few cases tend to suggest 
that if plaintiff’s own inexcusable neglect was responsible for the failure to name the correct 
party, an amendment substituting the proper party will not be allowed, notwithstanding ade-
quate notice to the new party. Although this factor is germane to the question of permitting 
an amendment, it is more closely related to the trial court’s exercise of discretion under Rule 
15(a) whether to allow the change than it is to the satisfaction of the notice requirements of 
Rule 15(c).” (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 1498, at 142–43)). 
91  Hedvat v. Rothschild, 175 F.R.D. 183, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (amendment to add partners 
of brokerage firm sued in original complaint would not relate back because failure to join 
them was a deliberate strategic choice and not the result of any mistake as to who was in-
tended to be sued). 
92  Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). John 
Doe substitutions, then, “may only be accomplished when all of the specifications of 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) are met.” Id. 
93  See supra text accompanying notes 46–49. 
94  Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 512 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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Rule 15(c)(1)(C) makes clear that the lack of knowledge of a John Doe defend-
ant’s name does not constitute a ‘mistake of identity.’ ”95 
However, this was not the only rationale in the decision. The court invoked 
the rarely-used provision in Rule 15(c)(1)(A) that permits an amended pleading 
to relate back when “the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations 
allows relation back.”96 The New York statute of limitations law “creates a 
special procedure for claims alleged against John Doe defendants.”97 To take 
advantage of this provision, there are two requirements: the party must “exer-
cise due diligence” to identify the defendant by name prior to the running of the 
statute of limitations, and must describe the Doe party “in such form as will 
fairly apprise the party that [he] is the intended defendant.”98 The court pro-
ceeded to find both requirements were satisfied; the plaintiff had tried unsuc-
cessfully to find the names, and “[h]is complaint describes with particularity 
the date, time, and location of the alleged spraying incident,” and “substantial 
detail concerning the appearance of his alleged assailants.”99 
New York’s “due diligence” requirement would seem to import back into 
the relation back analysis what Krupski said was not permissible under the fed-
eral rule—the knowledge and conduct of the plaintiff. However, the court 
viewed the provision in Rule 15(c)(1)(A) that permits relation back when state 
statute of limitations law allows it as affording “a more forgiving principle of 
relation back than the one provided in this rule.”100 This curious result was 
achieved after the Second Circuit’s failure to recognize that Krupski had reject-
ed its Barrow precedent. It does indicate that, in certain jurisdictions, recogni-
tion of fictitious designations in state statutes of limitations can be critically 
important. A district court decision from the First Circuit took a similar ap-
proach in a case involving civil rights claims under Massachusetts law in Pala-
cio v. City of Springfield,101 finding it therefore unnecessary to resolve the split 
among the federal circuits. 
                                                        
95  Id. at 518 (citing Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466, 470 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
96  Id. 
97  Id. Section 1024 of the Civil Practice Laws and Rules of New York reads: 
A party who is ignorant, in whole or in part, of the name or identity of a person who may 
properly be made a party, may proceed against such person as an unknown party by designating 
so much of his name and identity as is known. If the name or remainder of the name becomes 
known all subsequent proceedings shall be taken under the true name and all prior proceedings 
shall be deemed amended accordingly. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1024 (McKinney 2013); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 2015) 
(California’s Code of Civil Procedure permits a plaintiff to name Doe defendants if ignorant 
of their identity, and relation back of amendments substituting names is allowed). California, 
however, does not require a newly named defendant to have notice of the suit within the 
statute of limitations period. See James E. Hogan, California’s Unique Doe Defendant Prac-
tice: A Fiction Stranger Than Truth, 30 STAN. L. REV. 51, 100 (1977). 
98  Hogan, 738 F.3d at 519 (quoting Bumpus v. N.Y.C. Tr. Auth., 66 A.D.3d 26, 30 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2009)). 
99  Id. 
100  Id. at 518. 
101   Palacio v. City of Springfield, 25 F. Supp. 3d 163, 166 (D. Mass 2014). 
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CONCLUSION 
Complex relationships in governmental, corporate, and societal structures 
can often be hard to unravel when a plaintiff has to determine what defendants 
to sue for his injuries. Thus, flexibility in pleading is an important feature of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 15(a) provides that “the court 
should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”  
However, when an amendment is sought after the applicable statute of 
limitations has run, flexibility in pleading must be balanced against the objec-
tives of the statute of limitations that suit be filed within a reasonable period of 
time in order to avoid stale evidence and accord repose to potential defendants. 
Rule 15(c) provides for “relation back” of amendments to the filing date of the 
original pleading. The relation back rule contains a number of strict require-
ments aimed at not undermining the concern of the statute of limitations for 
timely notice to parties. Lower courts have sometimes taken different ap-
proaches to applying those requirements. The Supreme Court, in its 2010 deci-
sion in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.,102 waded into the controversy over 
one of the requirements—that a party to be brought in by amendment must 
have known or had reason to know that it would have been sued but for a mis-
take concerning the proper party’s identity. Although Krupski resolved some 
issues, a number of questions remain as to when changes in party defendants 
will relate back. 
Krupski held that relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what 
the party to be brought in knew or should have known, not on the amending 
party’s knowledge, diligence in discovering the correct parties, or timeliness in 
seeking to amend the pleading. This resolved a split in the circuits that resulted 
from some courts having denied relation back based on the plaintiff’s diligence, 
concluding that the plaintiff had not made a “mistake,” but only lacked 
knowledge of the correct identity or name of the defendant. The Second Circuit 
has continued to hold to that rationale in cases involving Doe designations, 
choosing to ignore Krupski as not having involved Doe designations. This re-
flects the concern that various courts have shown in past years that easy resort 
to Doe designations in suits against police, prison, and governmental officers 
could interfere with proper government operations. But there is little basis for 
such a concern and no reason that the Krupski rationale that looks only to the 
knowledge of the added defendant should not apply to governmental defend-
ants as well. The dilemma of a plaintiff whose civil rights have been violated 
by a government officer whose name or identity is not known is just great as 
Mrs. Krupski’s inability to discover within the statute of limitations period the 
correct corporation that owned the vessel on which she was injured. 
There are still situations in which Krupski would deny relation back. The 
decision was clear that amendments will not relate back when plaintiff is shown 
                                                        
102  See supra Part 1.B.3.a. 
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to have made a deliberate choice not to sue (as for stratigic reasons).103 It is also 
possible that when there was inexcusable neglect in not discovering the name 
or identity of the party before the statute of limitations has run, relation back 
may be denied.104 
As the lower federal courts wrestle with how broadly to apply Krupski, one 
intermediate possibility is giving importance to the provisions in Rule 
15(c)(1)(A) that permits relation back when “the law that provides the applica-
ble statute of limitation allows relation back.” The Second Circuit in Hogan v. 
Fischer105 relied on a New York statute that allows relation back in suits 
against Doe defendants so long as the plaintiff exercised due diligence prior to 
the running of the statute of limitations to identify the Doe defendant who is 
described so as to apprise it that it is intended to be sued. This state law “due 
diligence” requirement as to the plaintiff seems contrary to Krupski, but it did 
permit the Second Circuit to approve relation back. State statutes or court prec-
edents providing for relation back in Doe defendant cases could achieve the de-
sirable result of permitting amendments to relate back in similar situations. 
 
  
                                                        
103  See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text. 
104  See supra text accompanying notes 76–82. 
105  Hogan, 738 F.3d at 519. 
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